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Abstract
The existing literature on out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments has tended to
use binary models to analyse the determinants of catastrophic health spending.
In so doing, the literature ignores the fact that shares of out-of-pocket health care
payments which are used to dene the binary dependent variables are fractional with
a mass point at zero. Further to this, the literature makes no distinction between
factors which inuence the level and the risk of catastrophic health payments. In
order to address these shortcomings, this paper departs from this approach, and
uses the zero-inated beta regression instead. The paper also derives elasticity
formalae for the zero-inated beta regression. These elasticities allow one to talk
about both the statistical, and economic signicance of the di¤erent determinants
of health nonpayment, catastrophic health spending, and the risk of catastrophe.
Data from Malawis Third Integrated Household survey are used. The empirical
results indicate that the same variable can have a di¤erent e¤ect on the levels, and
risk of catastrophic health spending as well as OOP health nonpayment.
Keywords: Out-of-pocket payments; catastrophic payments; zero-inated beta;
elasticities; Malawi
1 Introduction
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments on health care can be catastrophic if they severely disrupt
household living standards. Such catastrophic payments can threaten living standards
either in the short term through the sacrice of current consumption, or in the long
term, through depletion of assets, dissavings or accumulation of debts (Xu et al., 2003;
Russell, 2004; Wagsta¤, 2006; Sparrow et al., 2013). Additionally, in the face of illness,
households may decide to forgo treatment at the expense of depreciating their human
capital (Sparrow et al., 2013), and this may in turn also a¤ect future household welfare.
The nancial protection of households from catastrophic payments is a widely accepted
conception of fairness in health nance (WHO, 2000, 2010). Besides, the economic risks
Department of Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, Box 280, Zomba, Malawi,
rimussa@yahoo.co.uk.
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associated with catastrophic health care payments have motivated the recommendation
for health care nance systems transition towards some kind of pre-payment mechanism
such as taxes or universal medical insurance (WHO, 2005).
In terms of policy, the identication of factors that inuence households to incur
catastrophic health payments is important, as it provides useful insights into which pop-
ulation groups are in most need of protection against incurring nancial catastrophe. In
order to model the determinants of catastrophic health payments, existing studies (e.g.
Su et al., 2006; Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012; Narc¬et al., 2014; Savitha and Kiran, 2015),
typically estimate binary probit or logit models where the binary dependent variable is
dened as whether a households share of out-of-pocket (OOP) health care payments in
the budget is catastrophic or not i.e. it exceeds a pre-determined fractional threshold.
However, this approach has four major drawbacks. First, using a threshold to demarcate
households into catastrophic spenders and non-catastrophic spenders leads to a loss of
information. Those below the threshold are treated as one homogeneous group and those
above the threshold as another homogeneous group. Second, the choice of the threshold
is inherently arbitrary, and therefore a matter of subjective judgement, and this can lead
to an internal logical inconsistency as noted by Pudney (1999) in the income poverty
literature. For di¤erent thresholds, it is possible to have reversals in the relationships
between catastrophic spending and the same set of determinants.
Third, the usual binary estimators are premised on the existence of an unobserved
but continuous latent variable which generates an observed binary variable (Wooldridge,
2010). In the case of catastrophic payments, the binary variable is derived from an
observed continuous variable, the share of OOP in the budget. Finally, household health
expenditure like other forms of household expenditure exhibits a point mass at zero. That
is, some households may not spend on health at all. Households may select into making
health payments, and therefore treating all households that dont make health payments,
and those whose health payments are less than the catastrophic threshold as the same
ignores the fact that separate stochastic processes may determine the decision to spend,
and how much to spend. It is well documented in the household health expenditure
literature (e.g. Deb et al., 2006), that excess zeros may arise from two decision process
being at play. Ignoring the presence of excess zeros leads to biased and inconsistent
coe¢ cients and standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010).
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, the paper contributes to the liter-
ature on catastrophic health payments through a re-examination of the determinants of
catastrophic OOP payments using a modeling approach which addresses the aforemen-
tioned problems. Specically, the paper uses a zero-inated beta regression to analyse
determinants of catastrophic health payments in Malawi. A key feature of the zero-
inated beta regression is that it nests the binary probit or logit, and the beta regression,
and this makes interpretation of results increasingly di¢ cult. The second contribution
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that this paper makes, relates to the interpretation of results from the zero-inated beta
regression. Specically, the paper derives elasticities for the zero-inated beta regression.
These elasticities allow one to easily talk about the relative magnitude of the e¤ects of
di¤erent independent variables on catastrophic health care payments.
The results from the zero-inated beta regression o¤er more policy relevant insights
into catastrophic health payments which can never be gleaned from the binary logit or
probit models as used in the existing literature. The model is able to distinguish between
the mean e¤ect of regressors, which captures changes in the expected value of the OOP
budget share, and the variance e¤ect of regressors, which measures risk. Increasing mean
e¤ects of OOP share can be addressed through for example, reducing user charges across
a wide range of health services, while reducing the risk of catastrophic payments requires
concentrating on payments for expensive but rare medical treatments (ODonnell et al.,
2005).
The studies which are based on binary models e¤ectively lump together households
that do not make any health payments i.e. zero shares, with those that have small OOP
budget shares, and then treat them as not incurring catastrophic medical expenditures.
This ignores the fact that those that cannot meet medical expenses could be foregoing
treatment. Arguably, such households, through the subsequent deterioration of health,
probably su¤er a greater reduction in living standards than those incurring catastrophic
payments (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). By isolating those households with zero OOP
shares, the zero-inated beta regression allows one to also examine policy relevant factors
that could be adopted to minimize health care nonpayment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the health care nance
situation in Malawi. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, and the variables and data
used. This is followed by the empirical results in Section 4. A discussion of the results
and their policy implications is done in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Health care nance in Malawi
Formal health care services in Malawi are dominated by two players namely; the govern-
ment and the Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM). For instance, over the
period 2002-2009, the government was providing an average of about 61% of health care
services, CHAMs contribution stood at 37%, and the remainder was covered by other
providers such as private practitioners and commercial companies (GOM, 2007, 2012). All
government facilities provide free health care services, with the exception of private wings
that exist in a small number of district hospitals and all central hospitals and outpatient
departments. Unlike government facilities, all CHAM facilities charge user fees, which are
heavily subsidized by the government and donors.
The health nance system in Malawi comprises the government, foreign donors, pri-
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vate individuals and players through direct OOP payments, and medical insurance. Donor
funding dominates total health expenditure in Malawi. For example, over the period,
2005-2009, donor contributions accounted for an average of 60% of total health expen-
diture. Donor contributions rose from 46% to 66% of total health expenditure between
2002/03 and 2008/09, while the share public sector domestic nancing decreased from
35% to 18%. Household health expenditure shares in total health expenditures, mar-
ginally declined from 12.2% in 2002/03 to about 11% in 2008/09 (World Bank, 2013).
Malawi has no social medical insurance, and private medical insurance, plays a mar-
ginal role as a source of health care nance; for instance, private health insurance man-
aged an average of 3% of total health spending between 2007 and 2009 (GOM, 2012).
The limited availability of private health insurance is unlikely to change in a signicant
way. Malawi has a small formal sector from which health insurance premiums could be
collected with relative ease. Besides, the informal sector is characterised by low wages
and salaries. The presence of a predominantly free public health care system distorts the
incentive for households to insure against unexpected illness and the consequent medical
costs (GOM, 2012).
The heavy reliance on donor funding to nance health expenditure is unsustainable
and leaves Malawi in a vulnerable position to external shocks such as aid suspension,
and nancial crises in donor economies. For instance, the execution of donor pledges was
a¤ected by the global nancial crisis which started in 2008 such that in 2011/12 only
25% of pledges were released (World Bank, 2013). This risk is further compounded by
the fact that pre-payment mechanisms such as taxes or universal medical insurance have
limited scope for growth in Malawi. All this then points to a strong possibility that going
forward, Malawis health care nancing system will shift towards full cost recovery or
cost sharing arrangements. This in turn suggests that in order to mitigate against the
nancing risks, and although the share of OOP health care spending is relatively low, it
is likely to increase rather than decrease in the future.
Already catastrophic health spending- dened as the ratio of health care payments to
household resources in excess of a fractional threshold (e.g. Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer,
2003; Van Doorslaer et al., 2007) - is showing a worsening trend. Figure 1 shows lev-
els and trends of the incidence (in percentage) of catastrophic health care payments.
The headcounts cover the period 2005 and 2011, and they are measured using di¤erent
catastrophic payment thresholds. Two measures of the share of OOP health payments
are employed namely; the OOP share in total household expenditure, and the share of
OOP in household non-food expenditure.
The incidence of catastrophic payments for all thresholds, and the two OOP shares, is
consistently higher in 2011 than in 2005. For instance, looking at OOP share of non-food
expenditure and the 10% threshold, the gure indicates that 9.7% of Malawian households
in 2005 incurred catastrophic health payment, and the prevalence of catastrophic health
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payments rose to 11.3% in 2011. Further to this, the deterioration in catastrophic health
care payments, is more evident for the OOP share in non-food expenditure than it is for
the OOP share in total household expenditure.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The zero-inated beta regression
Let fi be per capita expenditure on food of household i, ci be per capita total household
expenditure, then yi = ci   fi is a households ability to pay for health. One can
alternatively dene the fraction of health spending without deducting food expenditure.
Dene the fraction of health spending (h) in a households ability to pay for health as
vi =
hi
yi
2 [0; 1); then household health payments are catastrophic if vi > z; where z
2 (0; 1) is a threshold above which spending on health is considered catastrophic. The
existing literature then uses either the binary logit or probit to model the determinants
of catastrophic health payments. As pointed out earlier, this approach has its problems,
and to address these problems, I model the determinants of catastrophic health spending
directly by using the variable vi as a dependent variable instead. Since the proportion that
a household spends on health can have a point mass at zero, I use a sequential model which
distinguishes between the extensive margin (whether the proportions of health payments
are zero or nonzero), and the intensive margin (nonzero health payments proportions).
The presence of zeros means that the proportion that a household spends on health is
mixed with discrete and continuous components, and its density is a discrete-continuous
density which can be dened as (Cook et al., 2008; Ospina and Ferrari, 2012)
g(v;; ; ) =
8><>:
0 if v < 0
 if v = 0
(1  ) f (v;; ) if 0 < v < 1
(1)
where
f (v;; ) =
  ())
  ()   ((1  ))v
 1 (1  v)(1 ) 1 (2)
is a standard two-parameter beta distribution (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004; Smithson
and Verkuilen, 2006) which gives the probability density of v on the interval (0; 1), and   ()
denotes the gamma function. For the mixture density, E(v) = (1  ) and V ar(v) =
2 = (1  )V () +  (1  )2, where V () = (1 )
1+
is a variance function. The
parameter  is a location parameter, and the parameter  is a precision parameter since
for xed , the larger the value of , the smaller the variance of v. Di¤erent values of the
parameters  and  generate di¤erent shapes of the beta density.
Using the above zero-inated density, Cook et al. (2008) propose a zero-inated beta
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regression which was later generalized by Ospina and Ferrari (2012). The generalization
allows for the modeling of the variance of vi as well as the possibility of one-ination. I
use the model by Ospina and Ferrari (2012) as it allows one to handle excess zeros in
proportions, and the modeling of the variance of the proportion. The zero- inated beta
regression model can be dened as follows. Assume that each vi is an independently and
identically distributed random variable with probability density function given in equation
(1), then the zero-inated beta regression model is given by
f (vijx) = 1   (x0i) if vi = 0 (3)
and
f (vijx) =  (x0i)

  (i))
  (ii)   ((1  i)i)
v
ii 1
i (1  vi)(1 i)i 1

if 0 < vi < 1 (4)
where  () a cumulative density function of a logistic distribution which is strictly monotonic
and twice di¤erentiable,  is a conformable parameter vector, and xi is a vector of
exogenous regressors. The unconditional mean is modeled as E(vijx) =  (x0i)i =
 (x0i)E(vjv 2 (0; 1); x) =  (x0i)  (x0i) ; where  and  and are conformable parame-
ter vectors. The unconditional mean comprises the probability that a households makes
health payments, and the conditional mean of the proportion of health payments for
households that actually make health payments.  (x0i) ensures that predicted values of
vi are bounded between zero and one. If j has a positive sign, it means that covariate
xj increases the share of OOP health spending, which in turn indicates that it increases
the likelihood of catastrophic health payments.
I use the logit link functions for both equation (3) and the conditional mean, E(vijvi 2
(0; 1); x); as this is consistent with other studies (e.g. Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) and
Cook et al. (2008)) that use proportional data. Other possible link functions include; a
probit link, a complementary log-log link, and a log-log link (see Smithson and Verkuilen
(2006) and Ospina and Ferrari (2012) for details on link functions). To analyze whether
a variable contributes to the variance of vi beyond its e¤ect on the mean, the conditional
precision parameter i is modeled as follows
i = exp(x
0
i) (5)
where  is a conformable parameter vector. A positively-signed j denotes an increase
in precision, which in turn means a reduction in the variance or risk of catastrophic health
care payments. Since variances cannot be negative, in keeping with previous studies (e.g.
Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) and Cook et al. (2008)), I adopt the log link function to
ensure that this constraint is not violated. One can alternatively use the square root link
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function. The zero-inated beta regression reduces to the beta regression with precision
when  (x0i) = 1; and without precision when  (x
0
i) = 1 and exp(x
0
i) = 1:
In a nutshell, the zero-inated beta regression used in this paper has three submodels.
The rst (equation(3)) is a selection submodel; it captures how the probability that a
household spends on health depends on x. The second, i =  (x
0
i) ; is a location
submodel, it looks at how the average share of health spending varies with x conditional
on a household deciding to make health payments. Finally, the third model represented
by equation (5), is a precision submodel, it allows one to see whether, given the mean, the
risk of catastrophic health payments improves or worsens as a result of changes in x: The
vector of exogenous variables for the three submodels need not be the same i.e. there can
be partial or complete overlap of the exogenous variables. Estimation of the parameters of
the zero-inated beta regression is done through maximum likelihood (Ospina and Ferrari,
2012).
3.2 Elasticities in the zero-inated beta regression
The zero-inated beta models developed by Cook et al. (2008) and Ospina and Ferrari
(2012) only focus on signs and statistical signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients. Simply
using the estimated coe¢ cients one cannot say anything about the relative magnitude
of the e¤ects of di¤erent independent variables. In this paper, I derive formulae for
elasticities for the zero-inated beta model. Elasticities allow one to talk about the relative
magnitude of the e¤ects of di¤erent independent variables. The estimated coe¢ cients
from the zero-inated beta regression can be used to calculate elasticities for the three
submodels.
The elasticity of the probability that a household spends on health with respect to a
continuous explanatory variable xj is given by
@Prob (vi > 0jx)
@xj
xj
Prob (v > 0jx) =
jxj
1 + exp(x0i)
(6)
where Prob() denotes probability.
If the household spends on health, the conditional elasticity of the average proportion
spent on health with respect to a continuous explanatory variable xj is
@E(vijvi 2 (0; 1)
@xj
xj
E(vjv 2 (0; 1) =
jxj
1 + exp(x0i)
(7)
Using equations (6) and (7), the unconditional elasticity of the average proportion spent
on health by all households together, that is those with zero and nonzero health payments,
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with respect of xj is expressed as
@E(vijx)
@xj
xj
E(vijx) = xj

j
1 + exp(x0i)
+
j
1 + exp(x0i)

(8)
Thus, the unconditional elasticity of the average proportion of health spending, the mean
e¤ect, is made up of two parts: the rst part is an elasticity of probability of spending
on health (the rst term), and the second part is a conditional elasticity of the average
proportion of health spending for those households that make health payments. Similar
formulae are derived by Ramalho and da Silva (2009) for the two-part fractional regression
model.
I now turn to the derivation of elasticities for the precision submodel. Similar to
the elasticities for the mean of the proportion spent on health, there are three possible
elasticities for precision namely; the elasticity of probability, and the conditional and un-
conditional elasticities. If the household makes health payments; the elasticity of precision
with respect to a continuous explanatory variable xj is found by di¤erentiating equation
(5) to get
@i
@xj
xj
i
= xjj (9)
Furthermore, the elasticity of unconditional precision with respect to xj is given by
@i (x
0
i)
@xj
xj
i (x
0
i)
= xj

j
1 + exp(x0i)
+ j

(10)
Thus, the elasticity in the unconditional precision model, the variance e¤ect, can be
decomposed into two parts: the rst part is an elasticity of probability of spending on
health (the rst term); this is the same as that for the mean represented by equation (6),
and the second part (the second term) is an elasticity of precision for those households
with nonzero health payments.
Standard errors for the elasticities are calculated by using the delta method. The
elasticities along with their standard errors are calculated at the sample means of all ex-
planatory variables. The e¤ects of dummy independent variables are calculated di¤erently
from elasticities with respect to continuous variables discussed above. For these variables,
the changes resulting from a discrete (0 to 1) change in each dummy independent variable
is simulated holding other things constant.
3.3 Data, variables, and descriptives
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3)
conducted by Malawis National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). It is a multi-topic survey which
is statistically designed to be representative at both national, district, urban and rural
levels. It was conducted from March 2010 to March 2011. The survey collected informa-
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tion from a random sample of 12271 households which are located in a random sample
of 768 communities. The household level information collected includes socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics of households and individual household members. It also
collected household level data on OOP health care payments to cover: medicines (includ-
ing non-prescription medicines), tests, consultation, cost of travel to a medical facility,
in-patient fees, preventative health care, pre-natal visits, check-ups, out-patient costs, and
hospitalization costs including the cost of stay at a traditional healers or faith healers
dwelling. Information on a range of community-level variables and conditions such as ac-
cess to and availability of physical infrastructure and public services was collected through
interviewing key informants in each community. I consider the household as the unit of
analysis.
In keeping with the previous literature (e.g. Su et al.,. 2006; Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012),
I use, as my dependent variable, the share of health spending in a households nondis-
cretionary expenditure or capacity to pay (Xu et al., 2003; Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer,
2003), which is dened as per capita total household expenditure net of per capita expen-
diture on food. Since the data used in the study were collected from di¤erent locations
and times of the year, the dependent variable is converted into real values by using a
temporal and spatial deator. Figure 2 and Table 1 show results of the pattern of OOP
health care payments. The gure shows that the OOP share has a mass point at zero.
Specically, close to half of the households register zero OOP health care payments. This
is to be expected in light of the fact that Malawi has a largely free public health care
system. The fact that about half of the households have to make OOP payments on
health care could be a reection of the poor quality of the public health delivery system
which is characterised by drug and sta¤ shortages (GOM, 2012).
The distribution of the share of OOP is highly right skewed with the mean about ten
times the median. The asymmetry in the distribution of the share is further conrmed by
the Gini coe¢ cient which is about 0.8; suggesting that few households register high OOP
shares. There are about 5841 households, representing 47.6% of the total sample, with
zero OOP expenditure on health. In terms of modeling, this clump-at-zero and skewness
of the shares suggests that a zero-inated beta distribution may be a suitable model for
the data. The coe¢ cient of variation for the OOP share is greater than two, and this
implies that health care payments are highly unpredictable. The concentration index is
negative, indicating that poor households spend a larger fraction of their resources on
health care.
The set of independent variables that are hypothesized to determine the share of
health care payments, and hence catastrophic health expenditure, include household and
community characteristics, and locational xed e¤ects. Household size is a potential
determinant of catastrophic health payments. As argued by ODonnell et al. (2005), the
sign of the e¤ect of household size on health care payments is ambiguous, because on the
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one hand, in the case of a contagious disease, the proportion of a household that is sick
will be greater for larger households, on the other hand, larger households have a larger
supply of informal carers that can substitute for formal medical care and so constrain
health costs. Following Pradhan and Prescott (2002), I include the age composition of
the household as a proxy for health care needs. Health care needs vary with age in that
households with young children and elderly persons are more likely to spend on health
care. The age and sex of the household head are also included in the model.
The higher the household income, the higher is the households capacity to pay for
health care. I use a household wealth/asset index instead of total household expendi-
ture as a measure of household economic status, in order to avoid endogeneity problems
(ODonnell et al., 2005; van Doorslaer et al., 2007), associated with total household expen-
diture. The asset index avoids the endogeneity problem, because xed assets are unlikely
to be a¤ected by health expenditure, and measurement error. Dummy variables gener-
ated from quartiles of the household asset index are then used as regressors in the model.
The asset index is constructed by using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) (see e.g.
Asselin (2002) and Blasius and Greenacre (2006) for more details). The index is based on
a households ownership of the following assets: radio, television, furniture, washing ma-
chine, sewing machine, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, and car. The asset index might
still su¤er from omitted variable bias if a household experienced health shocks which led
to the depletion of assets, and an increase in health expenditure. To resolve this problem,
I include a variable which captures whether or not in the last 12 months, a household was
a¤ected by a serious illness or accident of household member(s).
Another important variable that might a¤ect OOP health payments is education. An
educated household may make more e¤ective use of modern medicine, and, this e¢ ciency
e¤ect of education (Grossman, 1999; Cowell, 2006), implies that households with higher
levels of schooling may be less likely to incur large expenditures on self-medication and
traditional therapies (ODonnell et al., 2005). The e¤ect of education on catastrophic
payments is captured by education-sex variables which reect the qualications of males
and females in a household. This gender di¤erentiation reects the fact that the returns
to male and female education may be signicantly di¤erent. The number of chronically
ill members in a household is included to capture the possibility that the presence in a
household of members who su¤er from chronic illnesses could lead to more health care
payments which in turn would increase the likelihood of incurring catastrophic payments
(Su et al.,. 2006; Li et al., 2012). Household living conditions can a¤ect health care
payments to the extent that hygienic home environments lower the likelihood of catching
diseases. I use the availability of sanitary toilets, safe drinking water and solid housing
with durable roof and walls in a household as measures of household living conditions.
I include community level medical infrastructure and economic infrastructure indices
to measure availability of and access to basic medical and economic infrastructure and
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services in a community. The presence of public infrastructure and services in a community
would for instance entail better living conditions, which in turn would lead to a lower
prevalence of diseases, and hence, lower medical expenses. The two indices are constructed
by using MCA. The health infrastructure index is constructed from information on the
availability in a community of the following: a place to purchase common medicines, a
health clinic, a nurse, midwife or medical assistant, and groups or programs providing
insecticide-treated mosquito bed nets free or at low cost. The economic infrastructure
index is based on the presence of the following in a community: a perennial and passable
main road, a daily market, a weekly market, a post o¢ ce, a commercial bank, and a
micronance institution. I also include rural-urban and regional xed e¤ects to capture
locational di¤erences in OOP health care payments. Denitions and summary statistics
for all the independent variables are given in Table 2.
4 Results
4.1 Model selection
Model selection criteria for the OOP share of total expenditure, and non-food expenditure
are summarized in Table 3. For both shares, four models are compared namely; the beta
regression with and without precision, the zero-inated beta with and without precision.
The log-likelihood, the Akaike information criterion, and the Schwarz Bayesian criterion
are employed to select the best model. These criteria suggest that the zero-inated beta
regression with precision outperforms the other three models. The interpretation of these
results is twofold. Firstly, they point to the inadequacy of the beta specication in
modeling determinants of catastrophic health payments. This means that there are two
separate stochastic processes; one governing the decision to spend (the extensive margin),
and the other governing how much to spend (the intensive margin). Secondly, the results
give further support to the generalized specication which accounts for risk as captured
by the precision model in OOP payments.
4.2 Results of the zero-inated beta regression
Maximum likelihood estimates of the zero-inated beta regression are displayed in Table
4. Considering that the data used is cross-sectional, the estimated model has a fairly
good t, with the McFadden pseudo R2 equal to 0.44. All the variables included in the
model are jointly statistically signicant, with 2 = 423:12 and p-value=0.00. A mixed
picture is observed in terms of how the variables a¤ect the level and risk of catastrophic
health payments as well as the probability of OOP health nonpayment. The results
indicate that the direction and statistical signicance of some variables is di¤erent for
the three submodels. This justies the use of the zero-inated beta as it enables one to
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examine the di¤erential impacts of the same variable on the levels and risk of catastrophic
health spending- as measured by the variance of the OOP health payment share- and
nonpayment. I now turn to a more detailed look at the results.
Since the zero-inated beta regression is more generalized, interpretation of results
becomes increasingly di¢ cult. To avoid this di¢ culty, I focus on elasticities developed in
this paper rather than parameter estimates. The elasticities o¤er more insight into the
relative magnitudes of the e¤ects of the di¤erent variables. With the elasticities in hand,
one can also talk about the economic signicance of the variables and not just their statis-
tical signicance. The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional level
for the location and precision submodels, along with their standard errors are presented
in Table 5. These elasticities reect the likelihood of nonpayment, and the conditional
and unconditional mean and variance e¤ects.
The sex of the household head has no statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability
that a household spends on health, and on the conditional level and unconditional levels
of the mean and variance of health payments. The age of the household head positively
inuences the probability that a household does not spend on health; it however does not
inuence the likelihood and risk of catastrophic health payments. The e¤ects of household
size on the probability, unconditional mean and unconditional precision of the OOP share
of health payments are statistically signicant. Household size negatively a¤ects the
probability of nonpayment as well as the precision of health spending, but positively
inuences the unconditional mean of health spending. This means that large households
are more likely to make OOP health payments, and, when they do, the payments are
large, and, the risk of making those payments is high.
The number of young and elderly household members, which captures household
health care needs, signicantly increases the likelihood that a household will incur OOP
health expenses. Conditional on spending on health, there is a statistically signicant
positive relationship between the number of young and elderly household members, and
the OOP share of health payments; implying that an increase in health care needs raises
the likelihood of catastrophic payments. Overall, holding all else constant, an increase in
health care needs is associated with an increasing risk of catastrophic health payments as
measured by the variance. Furthermore, the elasticities of health care needs with respect
to the unconditional mean of OOP health payments are 0.111 and 0.042 for children and
elderly household members. For the unconditional variance e¤ect, the elasticities are
-0.075 and -0.025 for children and elderly household members. The di¤erences in the
mean and variance e¤ects are statistically with z-statistics (p-values) of 2.6 (0.00) and
-2.5 (0.01) respectively. This suggests that households that have young children are at a
higher risk of facing catastrophic health payments than those have elderly members.
The e¤ects of household economic status as measured by quartiles of an asset index
show some interesting patterns. The quartiles are largely statistically signicant in the
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three submodels. Households that belong to higher wealth quartiles are less likely to make
OOP health payments. But conditional on making health payments, a positive relation-
ship exists between household economic status and share of OOP health spending; this
implies that richer households are more likely to incur catastrophic health expenditures.
Further to this, the signs of the elasticities for the third and fourth quartiles in the pre-
cision submodel are negative and statistically signicant; this means that relative to poor
households, rich households have signicantly more unstable health payments; which in
turn suggests that nonpoor households face a higher risk of incurring catastrophic health
payments.
Education has a gender-di¤erentiated e¤ect on the probability of nonpayment as well
as the mean and the precision of OOP health payments. Only the number of females with
either junior or senior secondary qualications matters. Precisely, the number of females
in a household with a senior secondary qualication is statistically signicant in the three
submodels while the number of females in a household with a junior secondary school
qualication is signicant in the location and precision submodels only. Although, the
ndings indicate that the elasticities for females with junior secondary school qualica-
tion are larger in absolute value than those for senior secondary school qualication, the
di¤erences are statistically and economically insignicant. For instance, the z-statistics
(p-values) for the di¤erences in the conditional elasticities between the two levels of qual-
ication for the mean and variance e¤ects are -0.31 (0.38) and 0.28 (0.61) respectively.
Households with a larger number of chronically ill members are more likely than
others to make health payments, to incur high levels of health expenditures, and to
experience less stable and therefore risky health payments. A similar pattern is observed
for households that experienced a health shock in the past twelve months. Since the
elasticities can be used to talk about the relative strengths of the e¤ects of the di¤erent
variables, the results indicate that the impact of the number of chronically ill members
in a household has the same order of magnitude as the impact of experiencing a health
shock. This pattern holds across the probability, conditional, and unconditional levels of
the mean and variance e¤ects.
Living in a house which has a durable roof or durable walls does not inuence the
probability that a household makes health payments. In contrast, and conditional on
making health payments, household living conditions as captured by the availability of a
durable roof and walls have a statistically signicant negative inuence on the mean of
health spending which in turn means that they lower the likelihood of catastrophic health
care payments. In addition, households that have a durable roof relative to those that do
not, have a lower variance of OOP payments; suggesting that they have a lower risk of
incurring catastrophic OOP payments. Furthermore, variables reecting the availability
of a toilet and clean drinking are not statistically signicant in the three submodels.
Both health and economic infrastructure in the community inuence health pay-
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ments. Specically, the presence of economic infrastructure increases the likelihood that
a household would spend on health, but economic infrastructure does not inuence the
level and risk of catastrophe. In contrast, community level health infrastructure is only
statistically signicant in the location submodel, where the e¤ect is negative, and in the
precision submodel, where the e¤ect is positive. This suggests that the availability of
health infrastructure such as clinics lowers the likelihood spends on health as well as the
mean and variance of OOP health payments. A comparison of the magnitudes of the
elasticities across the three submodels reveals that they are consistently larger for health
infrastructure than for economic infrastructure.
Household location matters when it comes to health care payments. Holding other
things constant, and relative to households in the southern region, households in the
northern region have lower mean and variances of health spending while households in
the central region have higher mean and variances of health payments. Rural house-
holds are more likely to spend on health, and conditional on nonzero spending, they are
more likely to incur catastrophic health payments. The results further show that there
is a statistically signicant rural-urban di¤erence in the risk of catastrophe where the
unconditional variance e¤ect is 20.2% lower for rural households.
5 Discussion and Policy Implications
Using the zero-inated beta regression provides some advantages over the standard ap-
proach of using binary models to study the determinants of catastrophic health payments.
The results are able to distinguish among factors that inuence the probability of health
payments, the mean share of health spending, and the variance of the share of health
payments.
The results indicate that poor households in Malawi are less likely to make health
payments. A possible explanation for this nding is that poor households are constrained
from diverting their resources to pay for health care. This has long term policy implica-
tions in that poor households maybe locked in an intergenerational poverty trap. Forgoing
treatment can lead to a deterioration of the human capital of household members (Sparrow
et al., 2013), which can in turn a¤ect future household welfare. The results have shown
that better-o¤ households are more likely than poor households to incur catastrophic
health spending. This nding is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Narc¬et al., 2014).
It has also been found that they have a higher variance e¤ect which implies that they are
also more likely to be at a greater risk of having higher OOP health shares.
The large variance e¤ect can be explained by the fact that public medical services
in Malawi are largely free but of low quality (GOM, 2012), which turn means that rich
households go for high quality and expensive medical services o¤ered by private clinics.
Thus, policies which improve the quality of public health services would instill condence
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in the public health delivery system by the rich, which in turn would reduce the risk
of OOP health payments. These ndings further suggest introducing user fees in public
hospitals as a possible way to improve the quality of health care may have the unin-
tended consequence of worsening the problem of catastrophic health payments among
poor households.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study which has conducted a gender dis-
aggregated evaluation of the e¤ect of education of household members on catastrophic
health payments. The existing literature (e.g. Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012; Narc¬et al.,
2014) simply focuses on the education of the household head. Focusing on the household
head, ignores the fact that a household can have better health outcomes on account of
having educated members even when the household head is not educated; that is, they
do not account for possible positive externalities of education.
The results of this paper reveal that it is only the presence of educated females and not
males which matters. Households that have more educated female members are less likely
to incur catastrophic health payments, and they have a reduced risk of catastrophic health
payments. This suggests that when it comes to OOP spending on health, the e¢ ciency
benets of education (Grossman, 1999; Cowell, 2006) work through the e¤ective use of
modern medicine by female household members only. The gendered-e¤ect of education
perhaps reects the fact women are primary care givers. In terms of policy, this nding
means that e¤orts to increase the number of educated women, would go a long way in
ensuring nancial protection in health payments.
In conformity with other studies (e.g. Pal, 2012), the paper has found that increasing
health care needs as measured by the number of young and elderly household members
greatly increases the likelihood of spending on health, and conditional on spending, of
incurring catastrophic health spending. It has also been found that the impact of health
care needs on the mean and the variance of health spending emanating from young children
is larger than that from elderly members. The policy implication of this nding is that the
Malawi health care system needs to focus more on health care, promotion, and prevention
which targets young children to reduce OOP health payments that might adversely a¤ect
households.
The role of infrastructure on OOP health payments has largely been ignored in the
literature. Findings from this paper indicate that infrastructure, especially, health in-
frastructure inuences health spending by reducing the likelihood of health payments,
and the mean and variance of health spending. This means that interventions which
improve access to and availability of health infrastructure in communities would lead to
lower OOP health payments.
The ndings also suggest that even after controlling for the availability of infrastruc-
ture, likelihood and mean share of health payments is higher for rural households. This
spatial-di¤erentiation perhaps reect rural-urban price/cost di¤erences in medical services
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especially low-end medical services such as medicines. It can also be explained by the pos-
sibility that the available health infrastructure itself might be of poor quality, which would
then suggest that rural households have no choice but to cover medical expenses through
out of pocket payments. Whatever the explanation, this nding has both short and long
term implications for the existence and persistence of rural-urban poverty di¤erentials.
Poverty in Malawi is signicantly higher in rural areas; for instance, poverty headcounts
in 2011 were 56.6% and 17.3% for rural and urban areas respectively (NSO, 2012). Such
catastrophic OOP health payments can throw rural households deeper into poverty either
through sacrice of current consumption, or through depletion of assets, dissavings or
accumulation of debts ( Russell, 2004; Wagsta¤, 2006; Sparrow et al., 2013).
6 Concluding Comments
The existing literature on out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments has tended to use binary
models to analyse the determinants of catastrophic health spending. In so doing, the
literature ignores the fact that shares of out-of-pocket health care payments which are
used to dene the binary dependent variables are fractional with a mass point at zero.
Further to this, the literature makes no distinction between factors which inuence the
level and the risk of catastrophic health payments. In order to address these shortcomings,
this paper has departed from this approach, and used the zero-inated beta regression
instead. The paper has derived elasticity formulae for the zero-inated beta regression.
These elasticities allow one to talk about both the statistical, and economic signicance
of the di¤erent determinants of health nonpayment, catastrophic health spending, and
the risk of catastrophe. Data from Malawis Third Integrated Household survey are used.
The empirical results have indicated that the same variable can have a di¤erent e¤ect on
the levels, and risk of catastrophic health spending as well as OOP health nonpayment.
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Figure 1. Incidence of catastrophic payments, 2005-2011
Figure 2. OOP share of non-food expenditure
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Table 1. OOP payments for health care as a percentage of non-food expenditure
Statistic Share of non-food expenditure
Mean 3.690
Median 0.341
Proportion with zero OOP 0.476
Coefficient of variation 2.102
Concentration index -0.036
Gini coefficient 0.781
Observations 12271
Note: sample weights are applied in the computation of all statistics to give population estimates
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable Description Mean SD
male Sex of household head (male=1, female=0) 0.760 0.427
age Age of household head in years 42.168 16.217
size Household size 4.563 2.208
num_5 Number of members under 5 years old 0.909 0.916
num_60 Number of members over 60 years old 0.238 0.526
quartile1 Household in first quartile of asset index, (1=yes, 0=no), base 0.254 0.436
quartile2 Household in second quartile of asset index, (1=yes, 0=no) 0.291 0.454
quartile3 Household in third quartile of asset index, (1=yes, 0=no) 0.226 0.418
quartile4 Household in fourth quartile of asset index, (1=yes, 0=no) 0.229 0.420
jce_female Number of females aged 20-59 with JCE 0.072 0.279
jce_male Number of males aged 20-59 with JCE 0.110 0.335
msce_female Number of females aged 20-59 with MSCE 0.040 0.215
msce_male Number of males aged 20-59 with MSCE 0.092 0.316
chronic Number suffering from chronic illness 0.239 0.533
shock Household affected by health shock (1=yes, 0=no) 0.123 0.329
wall_durable House has durable wall (1=yes, 0=no) 0.788 0.409
roof_durable House has durable roof (1=yes, 0=no) 0.357 0.479
toilet House has a toilet (1=yes, 0=no) 0.908 0.290
water House uses clean water (1=yes, 0=no) 0.929 0.257
health_index Index of health infrastructure -0.796 1.171
econ_index Index of economic infrastructure -0.002 1.000
north Regional dummy, north=1 0.188 0.390
centre Regional dummy, centre=1 0.344 0.475
south Regional dummy, south=1, base 0.469 0.499
rural Rural-urban dummy, rural=1 if rural 0.818 0.386
Observations 12271
Notes: JCE is Junior Certificate of Education, and it is a junior secondary certificate. MSCE is Malawi School
Certificate of Education, and it is a senior secondary certificate.
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Table 3. Model selection criteria
OOP share of: Model lnL AIC BIC
Non-food expenditure
Beta regression without precision -10852.60 21753.26 21585.02
Beta regression with precision -10989.40 22074.81 21751.78
Zero-inflated beta without precision -2786.20 5668.40 5304.67
Zero-inflated beta without precision -2572.77 a 5289.54 b 5155.66 c
a Preferred model based on the maximized log-likelihood (lnL) criteria.
b Preferred model based on Akaike information criteria (AIC); KL 2ln2AIC +-= , where K is the number of
estimated parameters.
c Preferred model based on Schwarz Bayesian criteria (SBC); NKL lnln2SBC +-= , where N is the number
of observations.
Table 4. Parameter estimates of the zero-inated beta regression
Variable Prob. SE Location SE Precision SE
male 0.029 (0.050) 0.032 (0.048) -0.072 (0.075)
age 0.008*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003)
size -0.100*** (0.011) 0.009 (0.011) -0.017 (0.017)
num_5 -0.171*** (0.026) 0.040* (0.023) 0.011 (0.036)
num_60 -0.177*** (0.055) 0.096* (0.052) -0.039 (0.075)
quartile2 0.154** (0.061) 0.176*** (0.055) -0.097 (0.084)
quartile3 0.171** (0.067) 0.343*** (0.062) -0.190** (0.096)
quartile4 0.319*** (0.073) 0.480*** (0.069) -0.362*** (0.100)
jce_female -0.094 (0.076) -0.170** (0.075) 0.204* (0.115)
jce_male -0.031 (0.060) 0.070 (0.059) -0.110 (0.091)
msce_female 0.185* (0.097) -0.255*** (0.095) 0.330** (0.135)
msce_male -0.000 (0.063) -0.006 (0.074) -0.101 (0.111)
chronic -0.419*** (0.043) 0.208*** (0.036) -0.199*** (0.054)
shock -0.760*** (0.066) 0.395*** (0.052) -0.404*** (0.076)
wall_durable 0.096 (0.060) -0.210*** (0.046) 0.150** (0.070)
roof_durable 0.067 (0.056) -0.117** (0.053) 0.051 (0.079)
toilet 0.125 (0.099) -0.057 (0.070) 0.084 (0.114)
water -0.103 (0.084) -0.029 (0.069) -0.109 (0.105)
health_index 0.015 (0.026) -0.042* (0.023) -0.083** (0.034)
econ_index 0.051* (0.031) 0.016 (0.029) -0.045 (0.041)
north 0.146** (0.073) -0.162** (0.066) 0.268*** (0.103)
centre -0.419*** (0.065) 0.108* (0.058) -0.183** (0.085)
rural -0.353*** (0.082) 0.218*** (0.080) -0.180 (0.121)
constant 0.582*** (0.170) -3.126*** (0.154) 2.978*** (0.242)
Chi-square 423.12
Pseudo-R2 0.44
Observations 12271
Notes: Prob. is the probability of zero health spending, Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s Pseudo R2. Standard errors (SE) in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering, *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
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